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The history of environmental philosophy testifies 
to two strands of tbought tbat stand in stark contrast 
to one anotber: antbropocentrism and biocentrism. In 
reaction to tbe traditional antbropocentric position, 
deep ecology has argued for a biocentric view of tbe 
humanity-nature relation. Against antbropocentrism, 
the deep ecologists have challenged the basic 
assumptions of tbe Western scientific-technological 
paradigm by proposing alternative paradigms that 
support biocentrism. One of the central issues 
confronting tbe development of an environmental etbic 
is the manner in which paradigms prefigure attitudes 
about nature. The approach of some deep ecologists 
is straightforwardly ontological as evidenced by the 
attempt to challenge scientific materialism as a 
paradigm about the nature of being. 
In this paper I want to explore some of the ideas in 
the later writings of Heidegger in order to show how 
they may be placed in tbe context of deep ecology. His 
ontology, I believe, sponsors a biocentric view that 
regards all natural entities as possessing inherent value 
by virtue of their interrelation to tbe surrounding world. 
In particular, I will discuss Heidegger's position in his 
essay "The Thing."1 The distinction he draws between 
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"thing" and "object" serves to lay bare the one-
dimensional mode of modem man that is largely the 
consequence of tbe quest to gain domination over nature 
through technology, and to thereby regard the natural 
world as a commodity. 
Michael Zimmerman is one deep ecologist who has 
emphasized the importance ofontology for determining 
conduct towards nature. Carrying forward the ideas of 
Heidegger, he states the matter in the following way. 
Ontological issues pertain to the Being of 
entities, to tbat, what, and how they are. Every 
culture has a common way of understanding 
what tbings are, although this ontology is often 
so pervasive that people are unaware tbat they 
have a particular way of apprehending tbings. 
Usually, we tbink things really are the way 
they appear to us. But this naive idea doesn't 
stand up to critical scrutiny; the fact is that 
how things appear is determined to some 
extent by the ontological paradigm in the light 
of which they are seen.2 
For Zimmerman, and for deep ecologists, ontology 
precedes ethics. We must fIrst know what things are 
before deciding what norms of behavior we ought to 
adopt. The ontology that we are implicitly or explicitly 
committed to determines the way value is ascribed to 
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the natural world. Heidegger's ontology may 
contribute to deep ecology in two ways. First, by 
offering a critique of anthropocentric attitudes toward 
nature. Secondly, by cultivating a new perspective on 
the theme of interrelatedness between man and the 
natural environment. 
Heidegger brings forward this ontology in his 
discussion of "the thing." Unlike a Platonic analysis 
into abstract entities that seeks to reveal eternal forms, 
Heidegger endeavors to uncover the nature of a thing 
that is more primordial than a sum of determinate and 
universal characteristics. He endeavors to reveal the 
particular concrete existent along with its interconnect-
edness to the world. His method is phenomenological 
in that it seeks to disclose that which shows itself in all 
its particularity. In contrast to modern technology which 
encourages a tendency to represent things as 
quantifiable objects to be controlled and dominated, 
Heidegger requests that we allow ourselves to be 
approached by the thing in its interrelation to the 
surrounding environment. 
This perspective serves to underscore an essential 
theme from the deep ecology view in that it·openly 
addresses fundamental assumptions about man's relation 
to nature. Things are not perceived as everyday objects 
when we allow the thing to present itself to us without 
pragmatic interests added to it. Rather than confronting 
the world, conditioning it, objectifying it for the sake of 
self interest, Heidegger recommends that we open 
ourselves to the world through attunement with it. 
Heidegger warns against confusing everyday objects 
with a thing. When the confusion does occur, "things are 
no longer admitted as things"; and because of our 
calculative mode of thinking, they will not be able "to 
appear to thinking as things."3 Everyday objects are 
conceptual constructs designed in conformity with our 
utilitarian interests. In contrast to this pragmatic posture, 
Heidegger suggests that we "let beings be," that means 
being attuned to the "unique ways in which entities 
present themselves or are. Letting something be can mean 
simply letting it alone, as in the case of not disturbing a 
wild place."4 Indeed, there is more involved in authentic 
thinking about the environment than the thinking that 
regards it as a mere sum of objects possessing only 
instrumental value. Thus a Heideggerian approach to 
deep ecology is initiated through a radical re-thinking of 
the calculative-utilitarian mode ofperceiving the world. 
Consequently, this inquiry brings forth a reappraisal of 
the way the world is intended. Heidegger writes, 
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When and in what way do things appear as 
things? They do not appear by means ofhuman 
making. But neither do they appear without 
the vigilance of mortals. The first step toward 
such vigilance is the step back from the 
thinking that merely represents....5 
In this passage Heidegger critiques the traditional 
epistemological distinction between the human knower 
and the object known. According to that distinction, as 
Heidegger sees it, the thing is surreptitiously identified 
as nothing more than an object constituted by universal 
characteristics. That view has dominated Western 
thought since Plato. Because we look upon things as 
separate from us we fabricate a dichotomy between self 
and world. Once the dichotomy has been manufactured, 
the thing is regarded as a mere object; it has a "separate 
location"6 from any other entity in the environment. 
Thus, a thing such as a tree, for example, is represented 
as an object with the trait of "life" somehow added to 
it. By man's continual "forgetfulness" he tends to add 
characteristics to a thing and treat it as an object to be 
subdued by human control. This attitude is suggestive 
of the calculative thinking which artificially fabricates 
the thing with a view to quantifying it. 
Through conceptually representing his field of 
experience, man objectifies the thing by reducing it to a 
set of concepts which artificially reconstruct the thing? 
Formulas are devised so the thing can be regarded like 
any object that is translated into the formula's mode of 
expression. The aim of calculative thinking is to reduce 
the thing to elements that are common with elements of 
other objects. The thing is fragmented into parts, and 
though it is a unique entity, its uniqueness is blurred as a 
resultof the fragmentation. This reduction has a utilitarian 
value because it enables us to grasp the thing in terms of 
universal concepts. As a consequence, things are 
represented as common objects. Because of the 
calculative mode, says Heidegger, "we separate subjects 
and objects, inside and outside, feelings and situations.... 
These many divisions are not separate issues, since each 
involves the same type of conceptual construct of 
things......8 In his essay, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," 
Heidegger expresses the manner in which the essential 
nature of the thing has been lost. 
Our thinking has, of course, long been 
accustomed to understate the nature of the 
thing. The consequence, in the course of 
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Western thought, has been that the thing is 
represented as an unknown X to which 
perceptible properties are attached. From this 
point ofview, everything that already belongs 
to the gathering nature of this thing does, of 
course, appear as something that is afterward 
read into it.9 ' 
Throughout the history of Western thought we see a 
constant attempt to uncover the substance of a thing. Yet 
Heidegger suggests that a thing's underlying substance 
cannot be discerned from that which is gathered around 
a thing. The effort to delineate an independent substance 
disfigures the nature of a thing because its nature is part 
and parcel of its surrounding world. 
Heidegger's investigation reveals the inauthentic 
attitude that man has developed toward the environment. 
"We ignore the intrinsic harmony of living beings, as 
well as whole biomes, for ontologically everything has 
been reduced to the level of raw material for production 
and consumption."10 
Although Heidegger has laid out the inauthentic 
attitude toward the environment, he offers an alternative 
for understanding the man/nature relationship. He 
illustrates this alternative by examining simple artifacts 
or natural entities as an example of a thing. Take a jug, 
says Heidegger, when we allow the being of the jug to 
come forth we observe that it presents itself as a process 
of "gathering in." It becomes the focus ofa whole set of 
interconnections with its environment. However, the 
process of "gathering in" is only one feature of the jug's 
essence. Within the jug's capacity to contain is also the 
capacity to offer and pour drink. Granted that the jug has 
utility for men, but this artifact has a deeper significance. 
The essence of the thing is that which gathers-up 
and comes-together, creating a presence of the fourfold 
unity ofearth, sky, gods and men. The thing manifests 
the harmonious interplay of the fourfold in the world. 
The jug is a particular unity that exemplifies the 
integration of the earth, sky, men and gods. The thing 
assembles the unity of the fourfold, making possible 
their interrelation to one another. The thing, wrote one 
commentator, "evokes the 'quadrate,' gathers into 
unified presences the four moments, brings them into 
an abiding 'stand still,' to self-manifestation, to 
unconcealedness."ll The earth, sky, men and gods are 
involved in one another so as to form a simple unity-
the fourfold. Zimmerman explains these moments by 
saying that the earth is "the life-giving aspect of things 
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that cannot and should not be violated," the sky is "the 
luminous aspect of the world necessary to draw forth 
what the Earth conceals," men are the ones who 
participate in the life process and the gods are an 
expression of the divine in a harmonious world.12 The 
harmonious interplay of the fourfold constitutes the 
moments of the world through the presence of a thing. 
Being a container, the jug gathers by taking and 
holding, but it further reveals the fourfold by pouring 
forth. Its out-pouring is a gift which regenerates the 
interplay of the fourfold. How is the fourfold gathered 
in the jug? The earth gathers since the drink comes from 
the earth's waters. The sky gathers because it offers the 
warmth of sun which is needed for the creation of the 
drink. The men gather since it is they who celebrate the 
joy ofdrinking. The gods gather since they are the ones 
whose honor is being drunk to. Thus, the jug reveals 
the mingling of the fourfold in the dimension of Being. 
The interplay of the fourfold suggests a value to the 
world that contrasts sharply with the value attributed 
to it by the technological paradigm ofanthropocentrism. 
For Heidegger the world is manifested as an opening 
which allows things to emerge; the world is that which 
comes forth and merges as a totality. Thus things are 
not lifeless atomic units detachable from their 
surroundings, rather they always bear an intimate 
relation to their environment. This view is compatible 
with the deep ecologists' emphasis on the interrelation 
of all things within a unifying matrix. For Heidegger, a 
thing is the center for the harmonious integration of the 
four moments ofBeing. Moreover, the world is revealed 
through each thing that comes to presence. Thus a thing 
is ''more than a mere fact, more than something 'at hand' 
(vorhanden). It represents in a unique way the full 
richness of all 'regions' of Being as a whole."13 The 
thing so revealed is not an object of technological 
domination, nor is it dislocated from its environment. 
An understanding of the thing is intertwined with an 
understanding of the world. . 
Unlike the anthropocentric view that sharply 
distinguishes between man and nature, Heidegger sees 
man as an integral part of the fourfold. Humans are 
"portrayed as one of the four aspects needed to 
constitute an authentic dwelling place. Like a deer or 
jug or tree or bridge, a mortal can be a 'thing' that 
provides the nexus through which the other participating 
dimensions of the world can reveal themselves."14 
The unity and interplay of the four members are 
further characterized by Heidegger as a "round dance" 
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(gering) where each member of the fourfold assemble 
as participants of a unifying process. The round dance 
involves a double aspect. On the one hand, it presents a 
unity of the fourfold; the four gather appearing as a 
simple unity. As the fourfold gives the appearance of 
being a simple prevailing unity, it is characterized as a 
thing. On the other hand, the round dance also involves 
a dimension which consists of the fourfold in their 
interplay. This aspect of the round dance is called the 
world. Through the moments of the round dance the 
world and thing are gathered together, mutually 
configurated, not juxtaposed to one another. World and 
thing are two moments of one and the same process of 
the round dance. 
It may be further pointed out that Heidegger's 
account avoids reductionism since both the thing and 
world retain their respective integrity. The world is not 
reduced to a mere collection of objects; the thing is not 
reduced to an atomic unit isolated from other entities. 
The fourfold, in the self-creating process of the round 
dance, are like threads which weave together the weft 
of the thing and world. 
Heidegger has spoken of the fourfold as being a 
"whole infinite relation." None of the fourfold "stays 
and goes one-sidedly by itself. In this sense, none 
are finite. None are without others. In-finite, they 
hold themselves to each other, they are what they 
are from this in-finite relation, they are this whole 
itself."15 The fourfold is an in-finite relation in that 
no one member has a unified and determinate nature 
in isolation from the other members. As in deep 
ecology, Heidegger emphasizes interrelations 
throughout nature. Tbings do not exist alone, they 
are what they are through their intrinsic relation to 
the environment. 
Wbere does man stand in the presencing ofthe world? 
He emerges as one who lives with things----a participant 
member of the fourfold. The integrity ofman is recognized 
by the fact thai he is a necessary feature of, and belongs 
together with, the fourfold interplay. Heidegger's 
discussion certainly breaks away from the one-dimensional 
man nestled in the paradigm of mechanistic materialism. 
The technological orientation ofcontemporary man veils 
the presence of the thing by representing it as an everyday 
object cut off from the world and having nothing more 
than an instrumental value. 
Heidegger's discussion of "thing" and "world" 
brings forth an ontological basis for interpreting the 
theme of interrelation that is an essential feature for 
Between the Species 96 
deep ecology. His reflections serve to challenge 
anthropocentric attitudes toward nature that have 
emerged with the development of a mechanistic world-
view. For deep ecology, he offers a way of regarding 
nature that is nonanthropocentric while boldly 
contemplating the possibility to "let beings be." For 
Heidegger, as for deep ecology, this means allowing a 
place for revealing man's interrelatedness and 
rootedness in Being as such. 
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